Is It Safe to Fly Over Sudan? EASA's Sudan Bulletin CZIB-2023-01R8 (Khartoum FIR), the May 2026 Airspace Reopening, and Why European Airlines Still Route Around It

Sudan is the odd one out on EASA's conflict-zone list. Every other Middle East and North Africa bulletin describes airspace that is, at least in part, open and flown. Sudan's airspace was closed outright for most of the war that began in April 2023, and then, in May 2026, the Sudanese Civil Aviation Authority announced it was reopening to domestic and international traffic. That announcement did not change a single word of EASA's bulletin. Conflict Zone Information Bulletin CZIB-2023-01R8 still recommends that European operators do not fly within the airspace over Sudan at any altitude, and it is valid until 31 January 2027.

So is it safe to fly over Sudan? This post reads the bulletin line by line, explains the difference between an airspace that a state has reopened and one that other states consider safe, lists the other national authorities that still say no, and shows how to check whether a flight between Europe and East Africa, or between the Gulf and West Africa, is routed around the Khartoum FIR. It sits alongside the dedicated explainers for the [Syria](/blog/easa-syria-airspace-bulletin-czib-2017-03r20-damascus-fir-explained), [Iraq](/blog/is-it-safe-to-fly-over-iraq-easa-iraq-airspace-bulletin-czib-2026-05-r2-baghdad-fir), [Lebanon](/blog/is-it-safe-to-fly-over-lebanon-easa-lebanon-bulletin-czib-2026-06-r2-beirut-fir) and [Persian Gulf](/blog/is-it-safe-to-fly-over-the-persian-gulf-easa-gulf-bulletin-czib-2026-07r3-bahrain-kuwait-doha-emirates-muscat-fir) bulletins.

What CZIB-2023-01R8 covers

The affected airspace is all altitudes and flight levels of the Khartoum flight information region, ICAO code HSSS, over the territory of Sudan. That is the whole country, from the Egyptian border in the north to South Sudan, and from the Red Sea coast to Chad. If the phrase flight information region is new to you, the [FIR explainer](/blog/what-is-a-flight-information-region-fir-explained) covers it; in short, it is the block of airspace one air traffic control authority manages, and the Khartoum FIR is one of the larger ones in Africa.

The bulletin was first issued on 26 April 2023, eleven days after fighting broke out in Khartoum between the Sudan Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces. It is now on its eighth revision. The most recent one, dated 24 July 2026, extended the validity to 31 January 2027 and changed nothing in the content. Like every CZIB it applies to EASA operators, the airlines regulated under EU air operations rules, and to third-country operators flying to, from and within the EU under an EASA authorisation. It is advice, not a closure; the [guide to how EASA's bulletins work](/blog/easa-conflict-zone-bulletins-middle-east-explained) explains that distinction and why airlines treat the advice as binding in practice.

What the risk description says

The description is unusually direct. It cites the continuing armed clashes between the SAF and the RSF and says the primary threat to civil aviation comes from military operations in which both sides have air assets, anti-aircraft artillery, MANPADS (shoulder-launched missiles) and surface-to-air missile systems available. It notes that aircraft on the ground are also at risk, because military operations have affected airports. And it names the mechanism that worries every conflict-zone analyst: the continuous risk of misidentification, miscalculation or collateral damage when parties use anti-aircraft weaponry.

EASA's conclusion is that the presence and possible use of a wide range of weapon systems poses a HIGH risk for civil flights at all altitudes and flight levels. That phrase, all altitudes, is the important one. Many bulletins distinguish between low-level risk from MANPADS, which cannot reach a cruising airliner, and the high-altitude risk from radar-guided SAM systems. Sudan's bulletin draws no such line, because the weapons in play on both sides include systems that can reach cruising altitude, and because nobody outside the conflict has reliable information about where they are.

The recommendation

The recommendation has two parts. The first is the blunt one: in view of the risk posed by military activities with air assets and air-defence capabilities, EASA recommends not to fly within the airspace over Sudan at all altitudes and flight levels. There is no exception for overflights at high level, no corridor along the Red Sea coast, and no carve-out for Port Sudan, which has been the country's functioning international airport for most of the war and was itself hit by drones in May 2025.

The second part is the standing instruction to monitor aeronautical publications issued by or on behalf of Sudan and by the aviation authorities of neighbouring states, including information shared through the European Information Sharing and Cooperation Platform on Conflict Zones, and to follow guidance from national authorities. That matters for the next section, because Sudan's own publications now say something quite different from EASA's.

Sudan reopened its airspace in May 2026. Why does the bulletin not care?

On 8 May 2026 Sudan's Civil Aviation Authority issued a NOTAM reopening the country's airspace to international traffic, four days after a drone attack on Khartoum International Airport had suspended operations there. Sudanese carriers resumed Port Sudan to Khartoum flights the same day, and the prime minister described the reopening as a full restoration of airspace for domestic and international traffic. A former head of the authority put the cost of the closure at between roughly 430 million and 1.26 billion dollars in lost overflight fees over three years, and argued that the airspace should have been managed by risk assessment rather than shut outright.

None of that is in conflict with EASA's bulletin, because they are answering different questions. A state reopening its airspace is a statement that its air navigation service is providing control and that it is willing to accept traffic. A conflict-zone bulletin is another authority's assessment of whether its airlines should accept the risk. The two are routinely different: Iraqi and Lebanese airspace are open and controlled, and EASA still advises against parts of both. In Sudan's case the gap is wider than anywhere else on the list. The war has not ended, the drone strike that preceded the reopening was on the capital's airport, and in November 2025 an Il-76 transport aircraft was reportedly shot down by a surface-to-air missile near Babanusa in the south. An open airspace with active anti-aircraft systems inside it is exactly what the bulletin describes.

Who else says no

EASA is not alone, and for passengers that is the useful part, because it means the no-fly advice covers airlines from several countries, not only EU ones. According to the conflict-zone summaries collated by Safe Airspace, as of October 2026:

• Germany prohibits its operators from entering the Khartoum FIR and upper information region.
• France tells its operators not to penetrate the Sudanese part of the Khartoum FIR and not to file Sudanese aerodromes as alternates.
• The United Kingdom recommends that its operators do not enter the Khartoum FIR within Sudan's territory.
• Canada recommends that its operators do not enter the Khartoum FIR.
• Italy's NOTAM tells operators to avoid the Khartoum FIR at all altitudes and is valid until 29 November 2026.

Who still flies there

Sudanese airlines, Badr, Tarco and Sudanair among them, operate domestically and to a handful of regional destinations, mostly through Port Sudan and, since May, Khartoum. Some Gulf and African carriers have served Port Sudan at various points in the war. Those are decisions made under other states' rules and risk assessments; they are not evidence that the EASA bulletin is out of date. If you are booked on one of those airlines, your flight is subject to that airline's regulator, not to EASA, and the bulletin tells you nothing about it either way.

For flights that merely cross Sudan, which is the question most readers actually have, the answer is simpler. European, British and most Gulf-based airlines have been routing around the Khartoum FIR since April 2023, and the May 2026 reopening has not changed that. Routes between Europe and Nairobi, Entebbe, Kigali, Dar es Salaam or Johannesburg that once ran down the length of Sudan now run either east, over the Red Sea and Eritrea or Ethiopia, or west, over Libya and Chad, depending on the day's other restrictions. The cost of those detours is real, and the post on [what conflict-zone avoidance costs](/blog/price-of-the-detour-what-conflict-zone-avoidance-costs) goes into it.

How to check your own flight

You do not need to trust any of this on faith. The methods in [how to check if your flight avoids conflict zones](/blog/how-to-check-if-your-flight-avoids-conflict-zones) apply directly, and Sudan is one of the easiest cases to check because the shape is so distinctive.

• Open the flight on a tracking site and look at a previous day's track for the same flight number. A route from Europe to Nairobi that hugs the Red Sea coast and crosses Eritrea or Ethiopia is routing around the Khartoum FIR. One that runs straight south-south-east from Egypt over Khartoum is not.
• Look for the dog-leg. Flights from the Gulf to West Africa that would naturally cross Sudan tend to show a visible bend north over Egypt or south over Ethiopia and South Sudan.
• Check the operator. If the airline is EU, UK, German, French, Canadian or Italian, the bulletins above apply to it and it will not be in the Khartoum FIR. For other carriers, use the track.
• If a route does cross Sudan, remember that an open and controlled airspace is not the same as a safe one, and that the states with the most conflict-zone expertise have all reached the same conclusion about this FIR.

What would change the bulletin

EASA reviews each CZIB at its expiry or sooner if the situation changes. The pattern for Sudan since 2023 has been renewal without change, and the current validity runs to 31 January 2027. For the advice to soften, EASA would need to see a durable ceasefire, the withdrawal or verified control of air-defence systems, and evidence that Khartoum FIR can be managed safely, including at Khartoum and Port Sudan airports. The May 2026 reopening is a precondition for all of that, not a substitute for it.

Until then, the practical answer to is it safe to fly over Sudan is that the airlines whose regulators have the most information have decided not to, and your flight almost certainly reflects that. If you want to know whether a specific airspace is open or closed on a given day, the [list of currently closed and restricted airspace](/blog/which-airspace-is-closed-right-now-august-2026) is updated as bulletins change, and the Sudan entry will be the last on it to move.